Professor Emeritus, University of South Florida
Agency Theory Main Page | Theories Main Page
Provided by James R. Martin, Ph.D., CMA
Professor Emeritus, University of South Florida
Agency
Theory Main Page | Theories
Main Page
Aboody, D. and R. Kasznik. 2008. Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: The role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Review of Accounting Studies 13(2-3): 216-251.
Abrahamson, E. and C. Park. 1994. Concealment of negative organizational outcomes: An agency theory perspective. The Academy of Management Journal 37(5): 1302-1334.
Agoglia, C. P., R. C. Hatfield and T. A. Lambert. 2015. Audit team time reporting: An agency theory perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society (44): 1-14.
Ahn, T. S., I. Hwang and M. Kim. 2010. The impact of performance measure discriminability on ratee incentives. The Accounting Review (March): 389-417. (The study considers the effect of discriminability on agent performance).
Albrecht, W. S., C. C. Albrecht and C. O. Albrecht. 2004. Fraud and corporate executives: Agency, stewardship and broken trust. Journal of Forensic Accounting (5): 109-130.
Ali, C. B., S. Boubaker and M. Magnan. 2020. Auditors and the principal-principal agency conflict in family controlled firms. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 39(4): 31-55.
Allen, F. and D. Gale. 2000. Corporate governance and competition. In Vives, X. (ed) Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
Amberger, H. J., K. S. Markle and D. M. P. Samuel. 2021. Repatriation taxes, internal agency conflicts, and subsidiary-level investment efficiency. The Accounting Review (July): 1-25.
Amershi, A. H., R. D. Banker and S. M. Datar. 1990. Economic sufficiency and statistical sufficiency in the aggregation of accounting signals. The Accounting Review (January): 113-130.
Antle, R. and A. Smith. 1985. Measuring executive compensation: Methods and an application. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 296-325.
Antle, R. and A. Smith. 1986. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 1-39.
Antle, R. and J. S. Demski. 1988. The controllability principle in responsibility accounting. The Accounting Review (October): 700-718.
Archer, M. S. 1996. Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Archer, M. S. 2003. Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation. Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, C. and T. Blackburne. 2012. Discussion of "Do voting rights matter? Evidence from the adoption of equity-based compensation plans". Contemporary Accounting Research 29(4): 1237-1248.
Armstrong, P. 1991. Contradiction and social dynamics in the capitalist agency relationship. Accounting, Organizations and Society 16(1): 1-25.
Arnold, V. 2010. Discussion of 'Continuous monitoring and the status quo effect'. International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 11(3): 253-256.
Arthurs, J. D., R. E. Hoskisson, L. W. Busenit and R. A. Johnson. 2008. Managerial agents watching other agents: Multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in IPO firms. The Academy of Management Journal 51(2): 277-294.
Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf. 2005. Offering stock options to gauge managerial talent. Journal of Accounting and Economics (December): 189-210.
Arya, A. and J. Glover. 1996. Verification of historical cost reports. The Accounting Review (April): 255-269.
Arya, A. and J. Glover. 2001. Option value to waiting created by a control problem. Journal of Accounting Research (December): 405-415.
Baber, W. R., P. L. Daniel and A. A. Roberts. 2002. Compensation to managers of charitable organizations: An empirical study of the role of accounting measures of program activities. The Accounting Review (July): 679-693.
Baber, W. R., S. Kang, and K. R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive compensation:: The role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics (27 May): 169-193.
Baber, W. R., S. Kang and K. R. Kumar. 1999. The explanatory power of earnings levels vs. earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. The Accounting Review (October): 459-472.
Baber, W. R., S. N. Janakiraman and S. Kang. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (June): 297-318.
Badertscher, B. A., S. P. Katz and S. O. Rego. 2013. The separation of ownership and control and corporate tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics (November-December): 228-250.
Baiman, S. 1982. Agency research in managerial accounting: A survey. Journal of Accounting Literature (1): 154-213.
Baiman, S. 1990. Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look. Accounting Organizations and Society 15(4): 314-371.
Baiman, S. and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 1991. The value of private pre-decision information in a principal-agent context. The Accounting Review (October): 747-766.
Baiman, S. and M. V. Rajan. 1994. On the design of unconditional monitoring systems in agencies. The Accounting Review (January): 217-229.
Baiman, S. and M. V. Rajan. 1995. The informational advantages of discretionary bonus schemes. The Accounting Review (October): 557-579.
Baiman, S. and R. E. Verrecchia. 1995. Earnings and price-based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics (July): 93-121.
Baiman, S., J. H. May and A. Mukherji. 1990. Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal-agent context. Contemporary Accounting Research 6(2): 761-799.
Baker, G. P. 1987. Discussion of an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Stewardship Uses of Accounting Information): 126-129.
Balachandran, B. V. 1990. Discussion of “Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal-agent context”. Contemporary Accounting Research 6(2): 800-803.
Balachandran, S., M. E. Carter and L. J. Lynch. 2004. Sink or swim? Firm's responses to underwater options. Journal of Management Accounting Research (16): 1-18.
Balachandran, S. V., P. Joos and J. Weber. 2012. Do voting rights matter? Evidence from the adoption of equity-based compensation plans. Contemporary Accounting Research 29(4): 1204-1236.
Balakrishnan, R. 1991. Information acquisition and resource allocation decisions. The Accounting Review (January): 120-139.
Balakrishnan, R., G. Drymiotes and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2019. The effects of biasing performance measurement systems on incentives and retention decisions. Contemporary Accounting Research 36(2): 1098-1121.
Baldenius, T., J. Glover and H. Xue. 2016. Relational contracts with and between agents. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April-May): 369-390.
Ballou, B., D. L. Heitger and T. D. Schultz. 2010. The actions-to-value framework: Linking managerial behavior to organizational value. Management Accounting Quarterly (Summer): 1-9.
Balsam, S. and S. Miharjo. 2007. The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics (March): 95-119.
Banker, R. D., G. Potter and D. Srinivasan. 2000. An empirical investigation of an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting Review (January): 65-92.
Banker, R. D., M. Darrough, S. Li and L. Threinen. 2019. The value of precontract information about an agent's ability in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Journal of Accounting Research (December): 1201-1245.
Banker, R. D., S. M. Datar and A. Maindiratta. 1988. Unobservable outcomes and multiattribute preferences in the evaluation of managerial performance. Contemporary Accounting Research 5(1): 96-124.
Banker, R. D., S. M. Datar and M. J. Mazur. 1990. Testing the optimality of a performance evaluation measure for a gainsharing contract. Contemporary Accounting Research 6(2): 809-824.
Barenbaum, L., T. F. Monahan and W. Schubert. 1995. Integrating research and practice in accounting education: The case of executive stock options. Journal of Accounting Education 13(2): 207-222.
Barkema, H. G. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 1998. Managerial compensation and firm performance: A general research framework. The Academy of Management Journal 41(2): 135-145.
Barker, J. R. 2018. Book review: B. H. J. M. Brummans (ed.): The Agency of Organizing: Perspectives and Case Studies. Administrative Science Quarterly 63(3): NP37-NP39.
Barnes, S. B. 2000. Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action. Sage Publications.
Bass, A. W. 1930. Executive and key men bonuses. N.A.C.A Bulletin (September 15): 89-97.
Beatty, A., R. Petacchi and H. Zhang. 2012. Hedge commitments and agency costs of debt: Evidence from interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies 17(3): 700-738.
Beatty, R. P. and E. J. Zajac. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly 39(2): 313-335.
Bebchuk, L. and J. M. Fried. 2004. Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Harvard University Press.
Bender, R. and B. Porter. 2003. Setting executive directors' remuneration in listed companies. Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research (Summer): 27-47.
Benston, G. J. 1985. The self-serving management hypothesis: Some evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 67-84.
Berger, P. G. and R. N. Nann. 2007. Segment profitability and the proprietary and agency costs of disclosure. The Accounting Review (July): 869-906.
Berrone, P. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 2009. Environmental performance and executive compensation: An integrated agency-institutional perspective. The Academy of Management Journal 52(1): 103-126.
Billings, B. A., X. Gao and Y. Jia. 2014. CEO and CFO equity incentives and the pricing of audit services. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 33(2): 1-25.
Bizjak, J. M., J. A. Brickley and J. L. Coles. 1993. Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics (January-July): 349-372.
Black, D. E. and S. S. Dikolli. 2013. Discussion of: Divestitures of equity by executives and future equity granting patterns. Journal of Management Accounting Research (25): 25-33.
Blazovich, J. L., G. R. Huston and J. M. Huston. 2014. Creating an executive compensation plan: A corporate tax planning case. Issues in Accounting Education (November): 1-8.
Boedker, C. and W. F. Chua. 2013. Accounting as an affective technology: A study of circulation, agency and entrancement. Accounting, Organizations and Society 38(4): 245-267.
Bol, J. C. and F. Moers. 2010. The dynamics of incentive contracting: The role of learning in the diffusion process. Accounting, Organizations and Society 35(8): 721-736.
Bol, J. C. and J. Leiby. 2022. Status motives and agent-to-agent information. Review of Accounting Studies 27(1): 122-147.
Bolt-Lee, C. E., D. B. Farber and S. R. Moehrle. 2011. Highlights of corporate governance research. Journal of Accountancy (September): 34-39.
Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory. The MIT Press.
Bonner, S. E. and G. B. Sprinkle. 2002. The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: Theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting, Organizations and Society 27(4-5): 303-345. (Summary).
Booth, P. and A. K. D. Schulz. 2004. The impact of an ethical environment on managers' project evaluation judgments under agency problem conditions. Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(5-6): 473-488.
Bottom, W. P., J. Holloway, G. J. Miller, A. Mislin and A. Whitford. 2006. Building a pathway to cooperation: Negotiation and social exchange between principal and agent. Administrative Science Quarterly 51(1): 29-58.
Bouwens, J. and L. Van Lent. 2007. Assessing the performance of business unit managers. Journal of Accounting Research (September): 667-697.
Bradshaw, M., G. Liao and M. Ma. 2019. Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major shareholder. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April-May): 255-277.
Brennan, M. J. and L. Trigeorgis. 1999. Project Flexibility, Agency, and Competition: New Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Bricker, R. and N. Chandar. 2000. Where Berle and Means went wrong: A reassessment of capital market agency and financial reporting. Accounting, Organizations and Society 25(6): 529-554.
Brickley, J. A. 2003. Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: A discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics (December): 227-233.
Brickley, J. A., S. Bhagat and R. C. Lease. 1985. The impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 115-129.
Brink, A. G. and F. W. Rankin. 2013. The effects of risk preference and loss aversion on individual behavior under bonus, penalty, and combined contract frames. Behavioral Research In Accounting 25(2): 145-170.
Brown, J. L., J. H. Evans III and D. V. Moser. 2009. Agency theory and participative budgeting experiments. Journal of Management Accounting Research (21): 317-345.
Burney, L. L. and S. K. Widener. 2013. Behavioral work outcomes of a strategic performance measurement system-based incentive plan. Behavioral Research In Accounting 25(2): 115-143.
Bushman, R. M. and R. J. Indjejikian. 1993. Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (January-July): 3-23.
Bushman, R. M., R. J. Indjejikian and A. Smith. 1995. Aggregate performance measures in business unit manager compensation: The role of intrafirm interdependencies. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Managerial Accounting): 101-128.
Bushman, R. M., R. J. Indjejikian and A. Smith. 1996. CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 161-193.
Butler, S. A. and M. W. Maher. 1986. Management Incentive Compensation Plans. Montvale, N. J.: National Association of Accountants.
Cadman, B. 2013. Divestitures of equity by executives and future equity granting patterns. Journal of Management Accounting Research (25): 1-24.
Cadman, B. and M. E. Carter. 2014. Compensation peer groups and their relation with CEO pay. Journal of Management Accounting Research 26(1): 57-82.
Callen, J. L. and H. Falk. 1993. Agency and efficiency in nonprofit organizations: The case of "specific health focus" charities. The Accounting Review (January): 48-65.
Callen, J. L., M. Morel and C. Fader. 2008. An empirical analysis of the incentive-action-performance chain of the principal-agent model. Journal of Management Accounting Research 20 (Special Issue): 79-105.
Callinicos, A. 2004. Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory (Historical Materialism Book Series, 3). Brill Academic Publishers.
Chan, K. H., E. J. Jiang and P. L. L. Mo. 2017. The effects of using bank auditors on audit quality and the agency cost of bank loans. Accounting Horizons (December): 133-153.
Chan, K. H., P. Lai Lan Mo and T. Tang. 2016. Tax avoidance and tunneling: Empirical analysis from an agency perspective. Journal of International Accounting Research 15(3): 49-66.
Chan, K. H., P. L. L. Mo and W. Zhang. 2021. Do abnormal IPO audit fees signal IPO audit quality and post-IPO performance? A principal-agent analysis based on evidence from China. Journal of International Accounting Research 20(1): 1-29.
Chen, C. X., H. Lu and T. Sougiannis. 2012. The agency problem, corporate governance, and the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general, and administrative costs. Contemporary Accounting Research 29(1): 252-282.
Chen, H. and F. Leng. 2004. Pay-performance sensitivity in a heterogeneous managerial labor market. Journal of Management Accounting Research (16): 19-33.
Chen, K. C. W. and C. J. Lee. 1995. Executive bonus plans and accounting trade-offs: The case of the oil and gas industry, 1985-86. The Accounting Review (January): 91-111.
Chen, Q., T. Hemmer and Y. Zhang. 2011. On the optimal use of loose monitoring in agencies. Review of Accounting Studies 16(2): 328-354.
Cheng, P. 1990. Discussion of “Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal-agent context”. Contemporary Accounting Research 6(2): 804-808.
Chong, V. K. and I. R. C. Eggleton. 2007. The impact of reliance on incentive-based compensation schemes, information asymmetry and organisational commitment on managerial performance. Management Accounting Research (September): 312-342.
Christensen, J. 1982. The determination of performance standards and participation. Journal of Accounting Research (Part II, Autumn): 589-603.
Christensen, P. O. and G. A. Feltham. 1997. Sequential communication in agencies. Review of Accounting Studies 2(2): 123-155.
Clinch, G. and J. Magliolo. 1993. CEO compensation and components of earnings in bank holding companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics (January-July): 241-272.
Cohen, J. R. and L. L. Holder-Webb. 2006. Rethinking the influence of agency theory in the accounting academy. Issues in Accounting Education (February): 17-30.
Cole, E. T. and J.P. Healy. 2000. Efficient CEO compensation: A data envelopment analysis approach. Advances in Management Accounting (9): 189-210.
Combs, J. G. and D. J. Ketchen, Jr. 1999. Can capital scarcity help agency theory explain franchising? Revisiting the capital scarcity hypothesis. The Academy of Management Journal 42(2): 196-207.
Comprix, J. and K. A. Muller III. 2006. Asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and income amounts in CEO cash compensation calculations. Journal of Accounting and Economics (December): 385-416.
Conlon, E. J. and J. M. Parks. 1990. Effects of monitoring and tradition on compensation arrangements: An experiment with principal-agent dyads. The Academy of Management Journal 33(3): 603-622.
Conyon, M. J. and L. He. 2004. Compensation committees and CEO compensation incentives in U.S. entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management Accounting Research (16): 35-56.
Cooper, B. J., L. Chow and Y. Tang. 1993. The separation of ownership and management in China: A review of the business contract and share capital systems. Corporate Governance: An International Review 1(3): 128-137.
Cooper, J. C. and F. H. Selto. 1993. Is risk preference induction a reliable method of controlling risk preferences? Journal of Management Accounting Research (5): 109-123.
Core, J. and W. Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28(2)(December): 151-184.
Core, J. E., W. R. Guay and R. S. Verdi. 2006. Agency problems of excess endowment holdings in not-for-profit firms. Symposium on the Role of Incentives in Not-for-Profit Organizations. Journal of Accounting and Economics (September): 307-333.
Coughlan, A. T. and R. M. Schmidt. 1985. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 43-66.
Cuny, C. J. and P. Jorion. 1995. Valuing executive stock options with endogenous departure. Journal of Accounting and Economics (September): 193-205.
Curchod, C., G. Patriotta, L. Cohen and N. Neysen. 2020. Working for an algorithm: Power asymmetries and agency in online work settings. Administrative Science Quarterly 65(3): 644-676.
Dalpiaz, E., V. Rindova and D. Ravasi. 2016. Combining logics to transform organizational agency: Blending industry and art at Alessi. Administrative Science Quarterly 61(3): 347-392.
Davidson, W. N. III, P. Jiraporn, Y. S. Kim and C. Nemec. 2004. Earnings management following duality-creating successions: Ethnostatistics, impression management, and agency theory. The Academy of Management Journal 47(2): 267-275.
Davila, A. and F. Penalva. 2006. Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation. Review of Accounting Studies 11(4): 463-493.
Davila, A. and M. Venkatachalam. 2004. The relevance of non-financial performance measures for CEO compensation: Evidence from the airline industry. Review of Accounting Studies 9(4): 443-464.
Dechow, P. M. 2006. Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns: A discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics (October): 193-202.
Dechow, P. M. and R. G. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (March): 51-89.
Dechow, P. M., M. R. Huson and R. G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges on executives' cash compensation. The Accounting Review (January): 138-156.
DeFond, M. L. and C. W. Park. 1999. The effect of competition on CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics (February): 35-56.
Deigh, J. 1996. The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge University Press.
DeJong, D. V., R. Forsythe, R. J. Lundholm and W. C. Uecker. 1985. A laboratory investigation of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Accounting Earnings and Security Valuation: Current Research Issues): 81-120.
Dejong, D. V., R. Forsythe and W. C. Uecker. 1985. The methodology of laboratory markets and its implications for agency research in accounting and auditing. Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn): 753-793.
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy (93): 1155-1177.
Demski, J. S. and D. E. M. Sappington. 1999. Summarization with errors: A perspective on empirical investigations of agency relationships. Management Accounting Research (March): 21-37.
Demski, J. S. and H. Frimor. 1999. Performance measure garbling under renegotiation in multi-period agencies. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Credible Financial Reporting): 187-214.
Demski, J. S. and R. A. Dye. 1999. Risk, return, and moral hazard. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 27-55.
Demski, J. S., H. Frimor and D. E. M. Sappington. 2004. Efficient manipulation in a repeated setting. Journal of Accounting Research (March): 31-49.
Demski, J. S., J. C. Fellingham and H. H. Lin. 2009. Tension relevance. Journal of Management Accounting Research (21): 241-248.
Demski, J. S., J. M. Patell and M. A. Wolfson. 1984. Decentralized choice of monitoring systems. The Accounting Review (January): 16-34.
Desai, M. 2012. The incentive bubble: Outsourcing pay decisions to financial markets has skewed compensation and, with it, American capitalism. Harvard Business Review (March): 124-132. ("Financial markets cannot evaluate individuals because they can't easily disentangle skill from luck.").
Dey, A. 2008. Corporate governance and agency conflicts. Journal of Accounting Research (December): 1143-1181.
Dhaliwal, D. S., G. L. Salamon and E. D. Smith. 1982. The effect of owner versus management control on the choice of accounting methods. Journal of Accounting and Economics (July): 41-53.
Dierks, P. A. and A. Patel. 1997. What is EVA, and how can it help your company? Management Accounting (November): 52-58. (Summary).
Dikolli, S. S. 2001. Agent employment horizons and contracting demand for forward-looking performance measures. Journal of Accounting Research (December): 481-494.
Dikolli, S. S., S. L. Kulp and K. L. Sedatole. 2013. The use of contract adjustments to lengthen the CEO horizon in the presence of internal and external monitoring. Journal of Management Accounting Research (25): 199-229.
Dirsmith, M. W., J. B. Heian and M. A. Covaleski. 1997. Structure and agency in an institutionalized setting: The application and social transformation of control in the big six. Accounting, Organizations and Society 22(1): 1-27.
Dobbin, F. 2010. Book review: Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of Organizations by T. B. Lawrence, R. Suddaby, B. Leca. Administrative Science Quarterly 55(4): 673-676.
Dopuch, N. 1992. Discussion of "Incentive compensation schemes: Experimental calibration of the rationality hypothesis". Contemporary Accounting Research 8(2): 409-414.
Douthit, J. and M. Majerczyk. 2019. Subordinate perceptions of the superior and agency costs: Theory and evidence. Accounting, Organizations and Society (78): 101057.
Douthit, J. D., L. W. Kearney and D. E. Stevens. 2012. Can agent cheap talk mitigate agency problems in the presence of a noisy performance measure? An experimental test in a single- and multi- period setting. Journal of Management Accounting Research (24): 135-158.
Dutta, S. and Q. Fan. 2014. Equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting. Review of Accounting Studies 19(3): 1047-1077.
Dutta, S. and S. Reichelstein. 1999. Asset valuation and performance measurement in a dynamic agency setting. Review of Accounting Studies 4(3-4): 235-258.
Dutta, S. and X. Zhang. 2002. Revenue recognition in a multiperiod agency setting. Journal of Accounting Research (March): 67-83.
Dye, R. A. 1992. Relative performance evaluation and project selection. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 27-52.
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1988. Agency- and institutional-theory explanations: The case of retail sales compensation. The Academy of Management Journal 31(3): 488-511.
Eldenburg, L. 1994. The use of information in total cost management. The Accounting Review (January): 96-121. (Part of a forum on accounting for not-for-profit organizations).
Eldenburg, L. and R. Krishnan. 2003. Public versus private governance: A study of incentives and operational performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics (August): 377-404.
Eldenburg, L. G., F. B. Gaertner and T. H. Goodman. 2015. The influence of ownership and compensation practices on charitable activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 32(1): 169-192.
Ely, K. M. 1991. Interindustry differences in the relation between compensation and firm performance variables. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 37-58.
Englund, H. and J. Gerdin. 2018. Management accounting and the paradox of embedded agency: A framework for analyzing sources of structural change. Management Accounting Research (March): 1-11.
Enis, C. R. 1993. Earnings-based compensation plans, performance, and capital expenditure policy in the motor carrier industry. The Accounting Review (October): 928-941.
Engel, E., R. M. Hayes and X. Wang. 2003. CEO turnover and properties of accounting information. Journal of Accounting and Economics (December): 197-226.
Erickson, M., M. Hanlon and E. L. Maydew. 2006. Is there a link between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud? Journal of Accounting Research (March): 113-143.
Evans, J. H. III and J. M. Patton. 1987. Signaling and monitoring in public-sector accounting. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Stewardship Uses of Accounting Information): 130-158.
Evans, J. H. III, K. Kim and N. J. Nagarajan. 2006. Uncertainty, legal liability, and incentive contracts. The Accounting Review (October): 1045-1071.
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy: 288-307.
Fan, Q. and W. Li. 2018. Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency setting. Review of Accounting Studies 23(4): 1715-1753.
Farrell, K. A. and D. A. Whidbee. 2003. Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics (December): 165-196.
Fee, C. E. and C. J. Hadlock. 2004. Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. Journal of Accounting and Economics (February): 3-38.
Fellingham, J. C. and R. A. Young. 1990. The value of self-reported costs in repeated investment decisions. The Accounting Review (October): 837-856.
Feltham, G. A. 1988. Discussion of "Unobservable outcomes and multiattribute preferences in the evaluation of managerial performance". Contemporary Accounting Research 5(1): 125-132.
Feltham, G. A. and J. Xie. 1994. Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relations. The Accounting Review (July): 429-453.
Ferris, K. R. and J. S. Wallace. 2009. IRC Section 162(m) and the law of unintended consequences. Advances in Accounting: Incorporating Advances in International Accounting 25(2): 147-155.
Firth, M., C. Lin S. M. Wong and X. Zhao. 2019. Hello, is anybody there? Corporate accessibility for outside shareholders as a signal of agency problems. Review of Accounting Studies 24(4): 1317-1358.
Fisher, J. and V. Govindarajan. 1993. Incentive compensation design, strategic business unit mission, and competitive strategy. Journal of Management Accounting Research (5): 129-144.
Forbes-Pitt, K. 2011. The Assumption of Agency Theory: A Realist Theory of the Production of Agency. Routledge.
Forst, A., M. S. Park and B. Wier. 2014. Insider entrenchment and CEO compensation: Evidence from initial public offering firms. Journal of Management Accounting Research 26(1): 101-120.
Foster, T. W. III, P. R. Koogler and D. Vickrey. 1991. Valuation of executive stock options and the FASB proposal. The Accounting Review (July): 595-610.
Foster, T. W. III, P. R. Koogler and D. Vickrey. 1993. Valuation of executive stock options and the FASB proposal: An extension. The Accounting Review (January): 184-189.
Francis, J. and A. Smith. 1995. Agency costs and innovation some empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics (March-May): 383-409.
Frederickson, J. R. 1992. Relative performance information: The effects of common uncertainty and contract type on agent effort. The Accounting Review (October): 647-669.
Frederickson, J. R. and W. Waller. 2005. Carrot or stick? Contract frame and use of decision-influencing information in a principal-agent setting. Journal of Accounting Research (December): 709-733.
Frezatti, F. 2002. The value management process: A proposal for linkage between shareholders and managers. Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research (Winter): 51-71.
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